An Examination of Buddhi

by Yogi Ananda Viraj (Eugene P. Kelly)

Certainly one of the most intriguing topics in the Samkhya-Yoga tradition is buddhi, variously translated as “intelligence,” “reason,” “intellect,” “mind,” “discernment,” etc. Obviously, each translation selected reveals the translator’s espistemological and metaphysical preferences. For the most part, we have chosen to leave the word untranslated as buddhi is not equivalent to any English approximation. Perhaps the closest we might come would be imagination. However, this word carries with it such a varied history, from Plato to phenomenology, that its usage may confuse rather than reveal. So, we remain with the Sanskrit.

Basically this is a two part essay. The first section provides a brief history, certainly not exhaustive, of the term. I have chosen to remain within what we might refer to as a “Hindu” context as any venture into its Buddhist employment would necessitate far too much work for such a short piece. The second section deals with the nature and role of buddhi in its Classical Samkhya and Yoga setting. I have tried to avoid the more scholastic considerations but was compelled to touch upon a major debate, that being the nature of buddhi’s “relation” to purusha.

So much more could have been and needs to be said regarding buddhi, especially for those engaged in Yoga practice. Yet, given the confines of the Journal an introductory presentation is offered in the hopes that both readers and practitioners alike can “fill in the gaps.”

The proper understanding and usage of the role of buddhi is central to the goal of Yoga-Samkhya. It is through buddhi that the knowledge that liberates one from the threefold frustration occurs. Also, the ignorance that binds one to frustration is an aspect of buddhi. Buddhi is the nexus of consciousness (purusa), the unmanifest origin (avyakta) and the manifest (vyakta). It is through buddhi that we come to know ourselves as all three members of the Yoga-Samkhya trinity and consciously embody the sacred movement of life, the Rta. We are at once the heartfelt pure consciousness which illumines the modifiable source thus giving rise to all creation, preservation, and dissolution, now. My wish is that this offering contributes to the trust each of us has been given to come to be in and as this ongoing divine creation.

History of the Term

Buddhi derives from the verbal root budh, meaning “to wake, wake up, be awake, to observe, attend to, to perceive, to understand.” From this root some common terms derive: buddha, buddhi, budha, bodha, bodhi. All share the meaning of awakening or understanding.

Although the word buddha appears in the Rg Veda, these appearances bear only a distant relation to the meaning “buddhi.”¹ Therefore our historical survey will begin much later with the so-called “principal” Upanisads.

Buddhi in the Upanisads

It is in the early Upanisads, namely the Brhadaranyaka and the Chadogya, that we find the fundamental reality is taken to be consciousness. By the time of the so called “middle” Upanisads there arose the need to relate consciousness to the manifest order, hence the notion of buddhi.

The first appearance of “buddhi” is in the Katha-Upanisad (ca. 400-200 B.C.E.) where the term appears four times. In Katha 3.3.3 the atman or self as pure consciousness is said to be riding in a chariot, the body, with the buddhi or “intellect” as the charioteer. The mind (manas) is said to be the reins.² Verse 3.3.4 continues adding the senses (indriya) as the horses and the objects of sense as what they travel over. The atman is then said to be an enjoyer or experiencer (bhoktr) when joined (yuktam) to them.

The second mention of buddhi in the Katha is 3.3.10 wherein we find a hierarchy leading up to the purusa, in the context signifying the all-pervasive consciousness, in 3.3.11.³ This hierarchy starting from the lowest in order to the highest reads as follows: senses, sense objects, mind, buddhi, great self (atma maha), the unmanifest (avyakta), and finally the purusa. In Katha 6.7.8 we find a similar structure except that it seems that buddhi is replaced by sattva (illumination, one of the three gunas). Also, there is no mention of sense objects.

The last appearance of the term in the Katha is in 6.10. Here the “highest way” is said to result from the cessation of striving (or stirring) on the part of the five sense knowledges, the mind (manas) and buddhi.⁴

In the Prasna Upanisad 4.8 we find a hierarchical ordering of experience similar to that found in the Katha. We find a movement from the five elements and their respective subtle components (matras), to the senses and their objects to the action capacities, (e.g., hands and feet) and their correspondencies (e.g., what can be walked), to the internal instrument (mind, buddhi, I-maker, or ahamkara) and its correspondencies (i.e., what can be conceived), to thought and what is thought, to illumination (tejas) and the illumined, to breath (prana) and that which it supports. As is only obvious at this point, this structure foreshadows the future Classical Samkhya tattva scheme. It is worthy of our attention here to note that the buddhi is associated with the boddhavyam or “that which is to be known.”

Also, in Prasna 4.9, the person (purusa) is said to be a boddhr or knower, a word derived from the root budh.

Moving now to the Svetasvatara Upanisad (ca. 400-200 B.C.E.) 1.5 where in discussing the source of all we are told that the brahma-vadin or “speakers of Brahman” understand him as:

A river of five streams,
from five sources, powerful and cunning,
whose waves are the five breaths (prana),
whose primal root is the fivefold buddhi,
with five whirlpools, a current of fivefold suffering (duhkha),divided into fifty, with five branches.

To reiterate, the buddhi is viewed as the primal (adi) root or origin (mulam) of brahman. It is through the operation of buddhi in conjunction with the breaths that brahman is made manifest in to what is termed brahma-cakra or “wheel of brahman” in 1.6.

In the Maitri Upanisad 6.5 the buddhi, manas (mind-organ), and ahamkara (I-maker) are said to be the likeness of consciousness (cetanavati). This may be interpreted in a number of ways and of course this would alter the translation of cetanavati. Hume translates it as “intelligence-form.”⁵ Radhakrishnan translates it as “thought-form.”⁶ For Hume the buddhi, manas, and ahamkara, later termed the antah-karana or “internal instrument,” having the form of intelligence would seem to mean that these three operating together are intelligence. For Radhakrishnan this operation is thought. We shall see later whether these two interpretations are adequate with regard to the function of buddhi. We now turn our attention to buddhi as it appears in the Bhagavad Gita (ca. 200 B.C.E. – 200 C.E.).

Buddhi in the Bhagavad Gita

Before we begin our discussion of buddhi in the Mahabharata, in general, we first look to the Gita. Buddhi is mentioned, in one form or another, approximately fifty times in the Gita. Our treatment of the term in this section will be cursory since our interpretation of buddhi will implicitly rely on the way in which the term is used in the Bhagavad Gita. For now, let us highlight some of the more prominent usages.

Throughout the Gita, the buddhi is spoken of as being of various natures. It is through having a buddhi of one type or another that one is considered to be wise or ignorant. The wise are those whose buddhi is somehow free of attachments, aversions, the sense of self (asmita) and ignorance (avidya), i.e., the five klesas (afflictions) of Yoga. Perhaps the most common usage is buddhi-yukta. Derived from the root yuj meaning “join,” buddhi-yukta comes to mean a buddhi that is joined to the atma “self” that is pure awareness. A buddhi not so joined or “yoked” (cognate with yukta) to the ­atma or purusa is joined to the derivatives of the buddhi. These derivatives are the tattvas or experiential functions and structures of the Samkhya scheme. They include ahamkara, (I-maker), manas (reflective mind-organ), five sense-capacities (buddhi-indriyas), five action-capacities (karma-indriyas), five “subtle elements” or experiential elements (tanmatras), and five elements (bhutas). Buddhi is the first tattva derived from the source or origin which is prakrti (also known as the avayakta “unmanifest” or pradhana “original source”). These tattvas are known in the Gita as the field. The knower of the field is pure consciousness (atma or purusa (see chapter 13). A buddhi which is joined to the knower is a disciplined or yoked buddhi.⁷

Another important theme regarding buddhi is the need to steady (sthira) the buddhi. It is through the stilling of the buddhi by overcoming attachment to the derivatives of buddhi, the discrete structures and elements of the field, that consciousness is realized as being the true knower and the I-sense (asmita) is not reified, i.e., taken as a substantial self and agent of action.⁸

Perhaps the most significant theme concerning buddhi with regard to Samkhya is its role in conjunction with the language of the three gunas: sattva (illumination, pleasure), rajas (activity, passion), and tamas (inertia, delusion).⁹ Buddhi is most akin to atman or pure consciousness when sattva-gunas predominates. Attachment to results of action arises when rajas predominates, delusion and inertia when tamas predominates. Therefore, the buddhi is held to be in one or another of these three structural modalities.¹⁰ When sattva predominates one is said to have the knowledge (jnanam) that “sees” the one in the many. This knowledge is said to liberate one from action which is binding. When one sees only the many without knowledge of the Vision/Reality (purusa/prakrti) in which it is rooted one is possessed by rajas, i.e., rajasic knowledge. Knowledge is said to be tamasic when one clings to one effect or result as if it were the whole (krtsnvavat) with no concern for the cause or purpose and missed the one in the many. In other words, the One is obscured by the many and the many is reduced to one of many.¹¹

We are now in a position to understand that a buddhi-yukta or “yoked intelligence” is an intelligence that is capable of “seeing” the timeless and ambient awareness (purusa, the knower) and the unmanifest prakrti (origin) as the foundation of all manifestations. The twenty-three other tattvas, the structures and elements of experience discussed above, are rooted in a reality (prakrti) out of which they rise and fall in view of pure consciousness. This realit is at the same time knowledge, i.e., prakrti and purusa. There are, in addition to the themes already mentioned from the Gita, others of great importance that will be implicit in our analysis. But for now we will move to a discussion of buddhi as it appears in the Samkhya tradition.

Buddhi in Pre-Classical Samkhya

We begin our investigation in the Mahabharata, specifically the Moksadharma portion and more specifically the Santiparvan which comprises the Samkhya and Yoga sections, (ca. 200 B.C.E. – 200 C.E.).¹² The story is about Pancasikha, third teacher in the traditional Samkhya lineage following Kapila and Asuri, who is engaged in a debate with one hundred other teachers about the fate of the “soul” after death. Pancasikha enumerates the various “entities” of which a human being is composed.

The five elements… come together on account of their svabhava (inherent nature) and dissolve by svabhava. The body, which is the result of the conglomeration of the elements, functions through jnana, usman [heat], and vayu. The entities which are essential for the life of an individual are: the senses, the objects of senses, svabhava, cetana, manas, buddhi, prana, apana, and other modifications (vikara). The buddhi experiences threefold experience – pleasure, pain, and non-pleasure/pain – which is the result of the three gunas. The body, which is the conglomeration of the elements, is the kseta (“field”) and the entity which indwells the manas is the ksetrajna (“field-knower”) (212.4). Sorrow results from the identification of the gunas with the Atman.¹³

Once again we see that the buddhi is intimately bound up with providing experience, here even said to be the experience. Yet, the “knower” is still held to be the atman. Somehow the gunas become identified as the self (atman) and the result is the buddhi’s experience of sorrow. We will be exploring this subject in detail later.

The next move in our historical examination still focuses on the (alleged) words of Pancasikha, this time from a much later source, namely quotations attributed to Pancasikha by Vacaspati Misra. There are a number of quotations supplied by Vyasa in his Samkhyapravacana-bhasya or Yogasutrabhasya (ca. 500-700 C.E.) that are attributed to Pancasikha by Vacaspati Misra in his Tattvavaisardi (ca. 850 or 975 C.E). Both these works are commentaries on the Yoga-Sutra of Pantanjali (ca. 300-500 C.E.).

In a discussion of how purusa or consciousness appears as the modifications of the citta (buddhi, ahamkara, and manas) Vyasa quotes: “There is only one perceiving (darsanam) and that perceiving is knowledge (khyati).¹⁴ It is a singular perceiving that is produced by a union of consciousness and buddhi (as citta). Again: “When one fails to see the purusa as other than buddhi, distinct in form (akara), nature (sila), knowledge (vidya), etc. one mistakes buddhi for atman through delusion.”¹⁵ The delusion (moha) being referred to here results from the tamasic perspective mentioned above, i.e., when the one is obscured by the many and the many is reduced to one of many. This inability to distinguish purusa from buddhi is the result of one of the five afflictions (klesa) in Yoga known as avidya or ignorance.¹⁶ In classical Samkhya this is known as one of the seven bhavas (“conditions”) which binds the purusa to buddhi. The outcome of this ignorance is termed samyoga (“association”). The association of purusa with the buddhi that is not “yoked” gives rise to a movement of reification wherein the self-making function of experience (ahamkara) becomes afflicted. This gives rise to a sense of self (asmita) which is held to be substantial. The function of “I-making” is no longer seen for what it is. Its product is now viewed as a conscious agent of action, thus usurping the roles of purusa (consciousness) and the three gunas (sattva, rajas, tamas) as the selfless unfolding of experience or manifestation. Our focus here is on Pancasikha’s statement that if one can avoid or shun samyoga, the remedy for sorrow (duhkha) would be final.¹⁷ It is essential that the intelligence be joined or yoked to consciousness for sorrow to end.

In another context wherein the purusa is viewed as the power of the experience or enjoyer (boktr-sakti), consciousness is said by Pancasikha not to undergo transformations (parinama), presumably the transformations of the three gunas, nor does consciousness come together or course (pratisamkrama) with objects (artha). It only appears to by “following” (i.e., taking on the form of) the modifications (vrtti-anupati) of the buddhi. Purusa or consciousness is therefore commonly termed a fluctuation of knowledge (jnana-vrtti) in so far as it resembles a buddhi-vrtti that has “grasped the form” (upagraha-rupaya) of consciousness and is not distinguished from it.¹⁸

At this point our historical survey of “buddhi” should take us to the Sastitantra the “Science of Sixty Topics,” at text or discussion “format” for the study of Samkhya. This text is attributed to Pancasikha and dated ca 100 B.E.C. – 200 C.E. However, the structure of the text that has come down to us is more schematic than prose commentary and begs for explanation.¹⁹

The text is also attributed to Kapila and Varsaganya. What is important for our purposes is that the Sastitantra ” …appears to be a fundamental framework or format in which Samkhya philosophy is discussed in classical and later times.”²⁰

The next teacher of importance for our discussion in the historical movement is Pantanjali, the Samkhya teacher (no to be confused with the composer of the Yoga Sutras). He “… does not regard ahamkara as a separate entity. He includes it within buddhi.”²¹ So a function of buddhi is I-making. This information is contained in the Yuktidipika, a Samkhya text dated ca. 600-700 C.E. and of unknown authorship. It is a commentary on the Samkhya-Karikas that refers to the views of numerous Samkhya teachers, some of them holding very diverse views. Contained in the Yuktidipika is the view of Varsaganya, whose followers are “… quoted to the effect that the purusa, having come upon the vrttis of buddhi, conforms itself to those transformations.”²² Here the buddhi is seen as having modifications that are conformed to or imitated by the purusa. So it would appear that experience, or at least the contents of experience, occurs in the buddhi and is rendered conscious by the purusa. However, another teacher, Vindhyavasin, again appearing in the Yuktidipika, claims that “everything is experienced in the mind (manas).”²³ Also, with regard to the functions of buddhi, ahamkara and manas, which are determination (adhyavasaya), self-assertion (abhimana) and reflection (sankalpa) respectively, Vindhyavasin is said to hold the view that they have a unity (ekatvam). This appears to contrast with most of the other teachers cited who declare them to be separate functions. There are a number of points of difference between the Samkhya of Varsaganya and that of Vindhyavasin which we need not enter into here. Suffice it to say that these teachers represent a kind of pre-classical Samkhya, i.e., the Samkhya prior to Isvarakrsna.

One crucial point, however, is that Vindhyavasin, “ … unlike Isvarakrsna, is of opinion that the ahamkara as well as the five subtle elements emerge from the buddhi; the Bhasya [Yogasutrabhasya of Vyasa] also endorses the same view.”²⁴ The above quotation only hints at it but Vyasa is held to be greatly indebted to the Varsaganya school of Samkhya of which Vindhyavasin was a follower. The reason for this view is that Vyasa, in the Y.S.B. occasionally quotes from Varsaganya, as well as employs various arguments of that school.²⁵ In addition to the point concerning buddhi and ahamkara, Vindhyavasin’s assertion that everything is experienced in the mind seems to be paralleled by Vyasa’s statement that, “the eleventh, the manas – all things (ekadasam manah sarvartham).²⁶ Also Vindhyavasin’s view of the ekatvam or “oneness” of the three functions of the internal organ cited above seems to correspond to the notion of citta in Yoga.²⁷ Citta is held by most commentators to be the simultaneous operation of buddhi, ahamkara, and manas. This operation is the modification of the citta or citta-vrtti.

A Discussion of Buddhi and Classical Samkhya

Duhkha

It is with the work of Isvarakrsna (ca. 350-450 C.E.), the Samkhya-KarikaI, that classical Samkhya is said to begin. This verse test is regarded as a “final summary formation of the ‘system of sixty topics’ (sastitantra).”²⁸ I the Yuktidipika evidence suggests that Isvarakrsna belonged to Varsaganya’s “tradition.” This shows that he “does not follow the innovations of Vindhyavasin.”²⁹ Therefore Larson feels that “it is …fair to suggest that his final summary formulation harkens back to some of the older views of that tradition.”³⁰ He adds that the Yuktidipika states the Isvarakrsna felt his role to be that of a mediator among the diverse view of the emerging Samkhya tradition. Suffice it to say for our purposes, the Samkhya-Karika represents the foundational work of classical Samkhya, guiding all subsequent sutra and commentarial work.

As with all the prior Samkhya teachers, Isvarakrsna is concerned with the alleviation of the threefold suffering (duhkha-traya): internal or personal (adhyatmika), external (adhibhautika), and divine or celestial (adhidaivika). Briefly stated these three correspond to mental and physical suffering, the suffering inflicted from external sources (e.g., other people, animals, objects, etc.), and the suffering brought about by gods, astrological forces, celestial phenomena and the like.³¹

Duhkha (suffering or dissatisfaction) can only be removed, according to Samkhya, through knowledge (vijnana). The deployment or practice of this knowledge is known in the Samkhya-Karika as tattva-abhyasa, i.e., the practice of the knowledge of the structures (tattvas) of the experience (pratyaya-sarga).³² Experience in Samkhya is broken down into twenty-five tattvas, lit. “thatnesses.” Starting with pure consciousness (purusa) as the first, we next have the source of the others known as prakrti, also known as pradhana (origin), and avyakta (unmanifest). It is through the association (samyoga) of consciousness and the origin or source, that experience of the other twenty-three tattvas may be brought about. The union of purusa and prakrti is our conscious human origin. By the gradual (or sometimes sudden) absorption of the other twenty-three tattvas back to this conscious origin, we come to a knowledge of the distinction between the manifest (the twenty-three), the unmanifest (prakrti) and the knower (purusa). According to Samkhya, this is our only means to liberation (vimoksa) from suffering.³³ This absorption coincides with the practice of tattva-abhyasa.

The reason for including the above discussion on suffering (duhkha is perhaps better translated as “dissatification”) is that it is through buddhi or intellect that the knowledge which liberates from duhkha is possible. Buddhi is the first tattva which results from the union of purusa and prakrti. As such buddhi is also known as mahat (the great one). The Yuktidipika state that it is called mahat because it is great in space and time. The function that buddhi is identified with is adhyavasaya, often translated as “ascertainment” or “determination.” According to the Samkhya philosophy of the three gunas, buddhi has two forms, its sattvika form and its tamasa form. Briefly stated the sattva-guna is the illuminative form of experience and the tamas-guna is the inertial from. Rajas-guna activates either side of the twofold forms of buddhi. Starting from the conscious origin (pursa/prakrti), wherein these three gunas are in equilibrium and not interacting, manifestation begins with buddhi and a disruption of the equilibrium and not interaction, manifestation begins with buddhi and a disruption of the equilibrium. Whereas at the origin the world, i.e., experience, is whole and undifferentiated, once the process of manifestation begins particularity sets in to dismember the whole. This is the act of buddhi. Buddhi is at once the effect of dismemberment and cause of particularity.

The doctrine of causalit held by Samkhyans is called sat-karya, “the existence of the effect.” In Samkhya there is no doctrine of creation proper. All the effects, that is, all of the tattvas that derive or emanate (sarga) from pradhana (the source) are held to exist already. The effect exists in the cause (prakrti).

Of what is not there is no coming to be;
Of what is there is no ceasing to be.
The final truth of these is also known to those who see the truth.³⁴

It is therefore held by Samkhya that the effect is different from yet similar to the cause. The difference being the differing configuration of the gunas that produce the variety of effects from buddhi to prthivi (earth). The similarity is that the cause and the effects are all composed of the three gunas and are modifications of prakrti.

The sattvika or illuminative form of buddhi is said by Isvarakrsna to be virtue (dharma), knowledge (jnana), detachment (viraga), and power (aisvarya). The tamasa form is the opposite of these.³⁵ These eight forms (rupa) are also known as the bhavas. These eight bhavas are further subdivided into fifty divisions (bhedas). These are divided into four groups: error (viparyaya), inability or incapacity (asakti), contentment or complacencies (tusti), and accomplishments (siddhi) (S.K. 46). This complicated bhava structure, which fleshes out the tattva scheme providing it with significance is called the pratyaya-sarga. The translation of this is somewhat problematic in that English does not have equivalents for either term. However, if we can get inside of how the bhavas function to provide meaningful experience, we can offer a suitable translation.

As we noted above, the bhavas provide the “flesh” on the tattvas or “bones” of the Samkhya scheme. Buddhi “houses,” as it were, the bhavas. We have already seen that the buddhi is identical with its function of adhyavasaya or “determination.” The buddhi is the first act that divides the whole. This act gives rise in its turn to self-sense or self as particularity, abstraction from the origin. This tattva is ahamkara, “I-maker.” As with buddhi, ahamkara is identical with its function of abhimana, the assertion of self-sense into experience, often translated as “self-conceit” (S.K. 24). From ahamkara a twofold emission (sarga) is brought about. On the one hand we have the “group of eleven” manifested by the self-sense known as vaikrta (modified, secondary, or derivative). This group is predominantly sattvika in nature. It includes the five sense capacities (buddhi-indriyas), i.e., eye, ear, nose tongue and skin; the five action capacities, i.e., voice, hands, feet, excretory capacity and generative capacity; and lastly the mind organ (manas). Manas functions as sankalpa “reflection.” On the other hand, we have the ahamkara’s manifesting the five tanmatras (lit. “merely that”), generally translated as “subtle elements.” The tanmatras are the experiential foci of the five sense capacities. This side of ahamkara’s manifestation is known as bhutadi, “the origin of the bhutas (elements).” It is through the sense capacities’ joining with the tanmatras that the experience of the five elements, i.e., space, air, fire, water, and earth, is brought about. The translation of bhutas as “elements” is somewhat misleading as the bhutas are never static in their sarga (emission).³⁶ This twofold manifestation or creation from the I-sense requires the activating movement of rajas-guna and therefore ahamkara is also said to be taijasa (shining or passionate) (S.K. 25). It is through the interaction of the three gunas as the functioning of ahamkara that the subsequent manifest (vyakta) is brought about.

We have yet to decide on an adequate translation of pratyaya-sarga. Manifestation has been brought about through the gunas via ahamkara, which has given rise to the five sense-capacities and the five action-capacities. The sense-capacities are said to function in their respective realms only, e.g., eye to color, etc. Their functioning is known as alocanamatra, (mere awareness). The action-capacities consist of the five functions (vrtti) of speaking, grasping, walking, excretion, and pleasure. It is the manas which functions as sankalpaka (reflection) that conceptualizes sensory and action manifestations. If it were merely the operation of intellect, I-sense, refletion, sensory awareness and action-capacities, experience would not be possible. These are structural functions that require meaning to be given from a contextual dimension. The bhavas provide such a dimension. Isvarakrsna states that with regard to something that is perceived in the present, i.e., a perception that requires a sense-capacity, manas, ahamkara, and buddhi, these four function simultaneously (yugapad), or, in the case of a vaguely perceived object, successively. So, in the case of seeing a jar currently in perception, the functions of alocanamatra (mere awareness), sankalpaka (reflection), abhimana (self-assertion), and adhyavasaya (determination) all work together at once to perceive “jar.” If there was a dimly lit room in which the jar sits, then they might function successively, slowly determining what the object was.

The point that must now be raised is exactly how a jar becomes a jar, not a jar in and of itself, which is a pure abstraction, but what a jar means. A jar means something, is something , beyond the mere thing in itself. The jar is a jar, gains its “jarness” if you will, by its participation in a whole, a matrix of historical cultural, social, linguistic and psychological significance. It is this matrix which determines (adhyavasaya) what is. The bhava structure schematizes this matrix, analytically isolating some of its outlines. It is the bhava structure which determines what is, from the most simple of perceptions, like a jar, up to the most subtle, such as the removal of the threefold suffering (duhkha-traya).³⁷ More will be said on this topic later in our discussion of samskara.

The tattva structure which functions (vrtti) through the bhavas is known as the linga (mark, sing, token, badge). The linga comprises the buddhi, ahamkara, manas, five sense-capacities, five action-capacities, and the five sensory foci (tanmatras). (The five elements, i.e., earth, water, fire, air, and space, are experienced through the tanmatras.³⁸) Reciprocally, the bhavas function through or are embodied through the functions of the linga (S.K. 52). This twofold creative activity (sarga) is the vehicle which provides the contents (pratyaya) of experience for the purusa or “pure consciousness.” We have finally come to the point where we have enough background to provide a translation of pratyaya sarga as “the movement of experience.” Sarga is most often translated as “creation” but that, to Western ears, casts a static shadow on the created. Creation seems to have been done once and for all. But Samkhya (and Yoga) have no such static version of creation in mind. Sarga is an ongoing act filled with significance (pratyaya) and charged with the life granting presence of pure consciousness which renders the movement experience.³⁹

We are now in a position to observe that the act of determination (adhyavasaya) is no simple operation. It is not the action of one substance (buddhi) on another (e.g., jar). It is the functioning of a whole, a matrix of historically accrued acts of knowing and acting (karma) which is necessarily present in any perception. What something is is its significance, what we do with it as well as what it is. This “background knowledge” is, as is obvious, conscious. However, this is no consciousness in our ordinary sense of consciousness of. As the Spanish philosopher Jose Ortega y Gasset termed it, it is a “consciousness we count on.”⁴⁰

From a Yogic and Samkhyan perspective we must distinguish between the acts of the buddhi and its pervasion by pure consciousness (purusa). Consciousness in this sense is the constant at the heart of experience. Even though not separable from the determining acts of the buddhi, it is distinguishable. It is in this sense that purusa is said to be isolated (kevala). The acts of the buddhi, bearing consciousness (samyoga), give rise not only to the perceived objects that are known through determination but actively construe the origin (pradhana) providing the circumstantial context or world in which those objects appear. To see a bird fly across the sky is also to be conscious in the matrix or living context that makes the bird possible. Earth, sky, clouds, trees, actions, spaces, knowledge, etc. all make possible “bird in sky.” The act of presupposing is an act of forgetfulness or concealment. We are, in Yogic fact, bodily (i.e., prakrtically) conscious in and as the matrix. Purusa is omnipresent, i.e., it pervades tattva-abhyasa, the return to the origin. One must suspend our inclination toward or away (raga and dvesa) from sense objects.

Karika 35 states that the internal organ or instrument (antahkarana), which is inclusive of buddhi, ahamkara (I-maker), and manas (mind organ), enters into or penetrates (avagahate) all objects. It is therefore viewed as the doorkeeper with the five sense capacities and five action capacities acting as the ten doors. Karika 36 goes on to add that the three functions of the internal organ differ from each other because they differ in gunas. Buddhi is the most sattvic being closest in nature to the purusa, i.e., consciousness pervades all through the buddhi because all is present to the purusa through buddhi. Ahamkara (I-maker) is the rajasic movement “of” the buddhi. Manas is the focal point for the movements of the sense and action capacities (ubhaya-atmakam) (S.K. 26). It is, in light of this, said to be an indriya (capacity, organ).

Karika 31 states that the internal organ or instrument (antahkarana) together with the ten capacities is called simply the karanam or instrument. The instrument has three functions: the action capacities seize (aharana) and hold (dharana) and the intellectual or sense capacities (buddh-indriyas) manifest or illumine (prakasa).⁴¹ The effect (karyam) of the instrument is ten-fold corresponding to the ten indriyas. The effect of the hearing capacity is sound, of feeling touch, of seeing sight, of tasting taste, of smelling smell. Regarding the action capacities we have speech, taking, walking, excretion and pleasure (S.K. 32). Gaudapada adds that whatever is “manifested by the sense capacities is seized and held by the action capacities.”⁴² Vacaspati Misra says, however, that the function of dharana (holding together, sustaining) is the work of the threefold internal organ (antah-karana). This dharana is performed on the body (sarira) which is composed of the five elements (bhutas). The vehicle for the movement of dharana on part of the antah-karana is the five breaths (prana). After the word prana in the text follows “etc.” (adi). Presumably the pranas function in conjunction with other components, perhaps the ten indriyas, although this is not made explicit.⁴³ We may conclude from this that the elemental body (sarira) is “held together” by the functioning of the breaths in conjunction with the sense and action capacities under the “direction” of the inner instrument.

Karika 33 states that the threefold inner instrument is contextualized by the tenfold outer instrument. The inner functions in the three moments (past, present, future) and the outer functions only in the present. Quite simply, the antah-karana works on the realms provided by the ten indriyas. It is here that we can return to complete our discussion of Karika 36. It states that “these,” referring to ahamkara, manas and the ten capacities, present all or the whole (krtsnam) to the buddhi for the sake of purusa like a lamp. As the components of a lamp function differently, as do the internal organs and capacities because of the differing guna configurations, they all cooperate to provide light. Light here would be analogous to the contents of experience provided to the purusa by the buddhi. It is because of this role of the buddhi that Vacaspati deems it superior among the functions of the thirteenfold instrument.⁴⁴

In addition, Karika 37 states that buddhi brings about all enjoyment of the purusa. The word translated here as “enjoyment” is upabhogam, also meaning “eating,” “consuming,” “using,”⁴⁵ In addition to buddhi being the conduit for purusa’s “food,” it also distinguishes (visinasti) the subtle (suksma) difference between the pradhana (the origin, i.e., mula-prakrti) and the purusa (S.K.37). Recall that we noted buddhi’s “similarity” to purusa as it was the most sattvic of the tattvas or functions of the internal organ. It is therefore the locus of discriminative knowledge, i.e, adhyavasaya as the function of buddhi is capable of accommodating consciousness. This view seems to contrast sharply with the view of Vindhyavasin, discussed above, that experience takes place in the manas. (See section on pre-classical Samkhya.) However, if we take into consideration Vindhyavasin’s position, presented under Karika 22 in the Yuktidipika, that the functions of adhyavasaya (attributed later to buddhi alone), abhimana (ahamkara’s function) and samkalpa (manas) share in some sort of oneness (ekatvam), a less radical contrast of views may be seen.⁴⁶ Ahamkara and manas, i.e., their respective functions, do operate in cooperation with the buddhi and therefore do indeed form a kind of oneness, at least in ordinary experience. This is borne out by a reading of Karikas 30, 31, 33, 35 and 36. As much as Vindhyavasin’s assertion that the manas is the locus of experiences sets him apart from Karika-Samkhya, it would appear that there is some degree of ambivalence when he is said to uphold the ekatvam of the three functions of the internal organ. An any rate, the difference is worthy of mention.⁴⁷

The Nature of Prakrti

The exact nature of the relation of buddhi to purusa is somewhat problematic, at least on a logical level. In order to present the subject properly, we must take a brief look at the nature of the purusa and prakrti as stated by Isvarakrsna and two of his commentators.

It is stated in Karika 10 that the manifest (i.e., buddhi, ahamkara, manas, the ten capacities, the five tanmatras or “subtle elements,” and the five elements) is caused , non-eternal, non-pervasive, active, plural, supported, mergent, composite, and dependent, and the unmanifest (avyaktam) is the opposite. We will make a cursory examination of each of these “qualities” of the manifest based on Gaudapada’s commentary.

Caused (hetumat) – Prakrti, pradhana, mulaprakrti, and avyakta are synonyms. The vyakta or “manifest” has a cause which is pradhana. Buddhi is caused by pradhana, ahamkara by buddhi, the five tanmatras and eleven instruments (manas and the ten indriyas) are caused by ahamkara. As for the five elements (bhutas), Gaudapada claims that space (akasa), is caused by the sound (sabda) tanmatra, wind (vayu) by the touch (sparsa) tanmatra, fire (tejas) by the form (rupa) tanmatra, water (apas) by the taste (rasa) tanmatra and earth (prthivi) by the smell (gandha) tanmatra.⁴⁸

Non-eternal (anitya) – Since it is produced, like a jar is produced from clay, the manifest is non-eternal. Obviously, the analogy is that the clay is pradhana and the jar is vyakta.

Non-pervasive (avyapi) – Only pradhana and purusa are all pervasive.

Active (sakriyam) – It is active in the sense that the manifest undergoes a wandering or passage at the time of samsara (i.e., the movement of manifest existence) employing the subtle body (suksma-sariram) which is endowed with the thirteen instruments.

Multiple (aneka) – It is multiple because the manifest includes a number of tattvas that are evolutes or manifestations of pradhana.

Supported (asrita) – Since its foundation is pradhana, it is supported.

Mergent (linga) – At the time of dissolution (laya) the “lower” manifect tattvas, e.g., the elements, merge into the “higher” (the tanmatras) tattvas.

Composite (sa-avayavam, lit. with members) – The manifest has components, e.g., sound, tast, touch, etc.

Dependent (paratantra) – All the manifest tattvas are dependent on their predecessors from the elements up to buddhi which is dependent on its foundation, pradhana.

These nine characterize the vyakta or “manifest.” The unmanifest is the opposite of these. We need not cite the characteristics of the unmanifest in its differences from the manifest here; this is all too obvious. However, Karika 11 does mention their similarities.

To begin with they are both composed of the three gunas. The pradhana, the unmanifest prakrti or “origin,” is the equilibrium or balance of sattva (pleasure), rajas (pain), and tamas (delusion) wherein they do not interact with one another to give rise to manifestation. Manifestation (vyakta) is the interaction of the three gunas which structure our human embodiments giving rise to our varying experiences of the manifest order. A thorough discussion of the gunas is beyond the scope of the present essay.⁴⁹

However, let us make use of an illustration that Gaudapada employs in order to shed some light on a most difficult topic, i.e., how all the tattvas and therefore things of the manifest order are composed of all three gunas. “Thus, a beautiful and virtuous woman is a source of delight to all, and she herself is the cause of pain to her co-wives; and again, she herself produces delusion in the passionate.”⁵⁰ He uses this illustration to demonstrate how sattva (pleasure, illumination) is the “cause” of the “arising” of rajas and tamas. She is a delight to all (sattva), and yet lurking within is the possibility, from another perspectival structure on the part of the co-wives, of pain (rajas) and yet another perspective (tamas) produces delusion. All three gunas are present in the perceptual system, the tattvas and their objects, with one or another dominating depending on the background or vantage point of the onlooker. Obviously, the cultivation of a sattvic viewpoint with regard to the manifest is preferred.

Secondly, the vyakta and avyakta are similar in the sense that both are undiscriminated (avivekin). Gaudapada explains that it is because:

It is not possible to discriminate as this is the manifest and these are the attributes, (gunas) as this is a bull and this is a horse, for those which are the attributes are the manifest, and that which is the manifest are the attributes.⁵¹

We could say that since the manifest is composed of the three gunas and the three gunas compose the manifest, they cannot be discriminated, one from another. It would seem however, that it is again a question of perspective. Does one view objects etc. as configurations of the gunas or as “what they are,” e.g., a beautiful and virtuous woman? Yes, she is composed of gunas and yes, she is a woman. It seems to be a question of the soteriological value of the guna perspective. It is not an either/or situation. Choosing the perspective of seeing the gunas at work enhances one’s prespectival fluidity fostering a more detached and mobile outlook. If one takes note of sattva’s fading in favor of the dominance of rajas or tamas, it would seem that one may learn to become sensitized to the role of historical (karmic) responsibility in act of perception/interpretation. In short, “seeing gunas operating on gunas short circuits the imposition of agency (abhimana) and promotes attention to the witness consciousness (purusa) which is other than the gunas.⁵² In addition, not only is the imposition of agency subverted, but the attribution of independent being to the object of the senses is also curtailed or even overcome.⁵³

The third similarity of the manifest and unmanifest is that they are both objects (visaya). All of the tattvas, other than the purusa (consciousness), are objective in relation to consciousness which is the only subjectivity.

Next, both are common or shared by others (samanya). In order to illustrate this Vacaspati Misra contrasts this commonality with the notion that it is only forms of knowledge or ideas (vijnana) which constitute pleasure, pain, and delusion. (Apparently a reference to a Buddhist or Vedantic point of view, or both.) But Vacaspati insists that the vyakta is common to several people simultaneously and he therefore avoids the seemingly idealistic view of his opponents. This is certainly not to be construed as an espousal of a realist thesis. Keep in mind the illustration utilized by Gaudapada above. The “beautiful and virtuous woman” was the “common” occasion for the movement of the gunas, i.e., pleasure, pain, and delusion. However, which configuration of gunas was dominant depended on the onlooker as much as upon the occasion (woman). In this way Samkhya is skirting both idealism and realism in favor of a middle road which grants equal reality to both sides of the human situation, I plus circumstance. Reality therefore is polar. Or more precisely, reality is always a human reality. Vacaspati goes on to further dismantle an idealistic position by stating that knowledge or idea (vinjana) belong to specific individuals. If ideas were truly the source of pleasure, pain, and delusion than all of the manifest (vyakta) would “have to belong specifically to specific individuals.”⁵⁴

Perhaps the most deceiving of the similar characteristics of the manifest and unmanifest is that they are non-conscious (acetanam). I use “deceiving” in a twofold sense. First, we must emphasize that buddhi, ahamkara (I-maker), and manas (mind-organ) are on the prakrtic side, as all three are included under vyakta. Our common notions of determination (adhyavasaya), self-assertion (abhimana), and reflection (samkalpa), the three functions what, generally, we in the West call “the mind,” are invariably held to be acts of consciousness. Not so in Samkhya (and Yoga). These functions “gain” consciousness as a result of their association (samyoga) with purusa. This is one level of deception; in theory we hold mind to be conscious. However, the more insidious form of deception is, according to the Yogis and Samkhyans, the experiential one.

Because of the association of the two [prakrti and purusa] the non-conscious appears as if designated as consciousness.
Similarly, the indifferent or inactive (udasinah) appears as if characterized by activity, because of the activities of the gunas.
(S.K. 20)

When the power of seer and seeing [appear] as a single self [that] is I-am-ness (asmita).⁵⁵

Essentially, these two quotations from two different texts are pointing in the same direction. The “non-conscious” is an obvious reference to the prakrtic side. Prakrti’s manifestations take on the “mark” (linga) of consciousness. The internal organ appears to be a conscious movement. The correlate to this is that purusa appears as if active when in (Samkhyan) reality it is only the gunas which are active. We have already noted elsewhere the significance of reciprocity in both Samkhya and Yoga.⁵⁶ Reciprocity works on many levels within the dyadic unfolding of experience in the framework of the Samkhya-Yoga perspective. When the tattvas of prakrti usurp the role of the purusa, the role of the gunas is reciprocally attributed to it. Yogically speaking, this mutal misidentification is I-am-ness (asmita), one of the five afflictions (klesa) of Yoga. Asmita is the confusion of the power of seeing (drk-sakti), which is purusa, with the power by which one sees (darsana-sakti) which is the buddhi.⁵⁷

To draw out some of the implication of this misidentification, we must refer once again to the “beautiful and virtuous” woman illustration. The apprehension of the pleasure, pain or delusion (sattva, rajas, or tamas) by an onlooker normally takes the form of an I perceiving a that, the perception of which carries pleasure, pain or delusion. One of the gunas will dominate the other, two will be in the mode of supporting or activating, and all three will be interacting. This perception will carry the weight of attachment (raga) or aversion (dvesa) or ultimately a “clinging to an entrenched perspective” (abhinivesa) which is deluding. The fundamental error hidden within this structure is the appropriation of consciousness by the movements of “normal perception” thereby imputing to the object (the woman) a significance which the object does not bear intrinsically. Had this radical error not implicated itself into the act of perception, or had an alternative “perceiving” been available, the attachment, aversion or clinging and their attendant dissatisfaction (duhkha) could have been averted. Recall that consciousness is indifferent (udasina). If the role of the true seer (purusa) is not usurped, the “object” is simply “seen” from no-point-of-view; yet significant perspectives may arise carrying or being inseparable from their gunas configurations without the normally attendant attachment, aversion, and delusion. This correction of the fundamental error (avidya) demonstrates consciousness to be inactive or unmoved by these modifications (parinama) of the gunas.

The underlying “perceiving without preference” is realized to be a structural aspect of experience that had formally been concealed by the exclusive focus on the object of experience colored by the potency of habit (samskara). Nothing is added to experience. One feels or accustoms one’s experience into “accepting” this more fundamental or underlying “reality.” I employ “reality” because there is, in addition to consciousness, another aspect of this “seeing.” Consciousness is said to be limited only through its association with certain of the bhavas or rupas that are incarnate in the linga, i.e., the thirteen-fold instrument plus the five tanmantras.⁵⁸ It is through the bhava of knowledge (jnanam), that is the knowledge that knows the manifest, unmanifest and knower (purusa), that purusa is released from limitation, or more correctly is realized to be unlimited. However, this realization of the limitlessness of consciousness is synonymous with the embodied illumination of the entire field or horizon out of which particularity arises, i.e., the manifest. It is the operation of the gunas and their attendant perspectives which, under the influence of the fundamental error (samyoga and avidya), confine consciousness and correlatively, embodiments to the aforementioned perspective of concealment.⁵⁹ Not having available the witnessing by pure consciousness and its mate, the non-significant field which underlies interpretation, the internal organ of prakrti is taken to be the conscious self; the indifference of purusa is concealed. Purusa is now construed as an active agent. Consequently, what is “really” or “intrinsically” there is what the mind (manas) says is there, fed by the (historically) accumulated acts of the past that take root in the buddhi as the other seven bhavas and their distinctions or varieties (bhedas). In this perspective there is no neutrally conscious ground from which it is revealed that gunas (and their attendant perspectives) are operating on gunas.

The “neutrally conscious ground” that is being referred to here is somewhat vague. Let us attempt to lend some clarity by way of quotation and explanation.

The Yogin whose self is content with
Knowledge and understanding,
Who is unchanging with conquered sense capacities,
To whom clay, stone and gold are the same
Is said to be fixed in Yoga (or disciplined).⁶⁰

When the true seer or “power of seeing” is revealed, a unconstrued field or ground is its correlate. The values (interpretations) that normally accrue to the field and its objects (gold, clay, stone) are absent. In their stead, an incarnate, living, and sacred dimension is seen which implies the union, in its purely sattvic form, of the seer and seen, purusa and prakrti. This dyad is not the dualism of our everyday subjectivity and objectivity but the residing of all beings in the self.⁶¹ The neutrality of the purusa, or the “sight” which is purusa, underlies all valuation and hence an “object” appears to the mind as the object alone and the mind appears “empty of itself.”⁶² The Gita’s equation of knowledge and understanding (jnana-vijnana) with the “sameness” of clay, stone and gold, indicates the purity or “empty” nature of the mind (citta) and the witnessing of the neutral purusa. However, we must not loose sight of the fact that the mind may move to make the value distinctions of clay, stone, and gold, but the tacit and discriminative knowledge, on the basis of the witnessing of the purusa and its prakrtic correlate, is able to acknowledge their conventional or interpretive nature. There is a kind of double vision at work here, the seer’s, and as a result of the seer’s presence, the mind’s.

After that lengthy discussion on the topic of the non-conscious nature of the manifest and the unmanifest, we may now return to the last of the characteristics that they both share, that is, they are productive (prasava dharmi). The word prasava is derived from the verbal root su which may mean “to press out” (as in the soma ritual) or “generate, enliven, impel.”⁶³ In both instances there is the act of deriving. Generally translated in the Samkhya Karikas as “productive,” it could also mean to “set in motion, impulse, stimulation, generation,” etc. So the term prasavadharmi denotes “having productivity,” This is explained by Gaudapada as prakrti or pradhana’s production of buddhi, ahamkara from buddhi, the five sensations or subtle elements (tanmatras) and the eleven indriyas (manas, five sense capacities, five action capacities) from ahamkara, and from the five tanmatras, the five elements.

In concluding Karika 11 Isvarakrsna states that purusa is opposite of these characteristics of the manifest and unmanifest. Gaudapada clarifies this by saying the purusa is without gunas (nirguna), discriminating (viveki), non-objective (avisaya), non-general or specific (asamanya), conscious (cetana) and non-productive (aprasavadharmi).

Nature of Purusa

Above we discussed Karika 10 and how the unmanifest differs from the manifest. At the end of Karika 11 the purusa is held to be different from yet similar to pradhana. Purusa, referred to as puman, a synonym (S.K. 11), is similar to the unmanifest in the same way as the unmanifest is different from the manifest. Therefore purusa is uncaused, eternal, all pervasive, inactive, singular (undivided), unsupported, non-mergent, simple (i.e., without parts), and independent.

In S.K. 17 five reasons are given for the existence of purusa:

Aggregrations (samghata) exist for the sake of another. Gaudapada explains that like the parts of a bed, which are non-conscious, which together make up a bed and serve the purpose of another, so too, the composites of mahat and the rest of the tattvas serve the purusa.

Because all composites are made of the three gunas, the purusa must be other than or opposite from the gunas.

The purusa exists because of the need for a governor or controller. Here the word adhisthana is used, meaning “standing by, being at hand, standing upon, a basis or base, the standing place of a warrior upon the car.” If we consider that the structures of experience, i.e., the tattvas and pratyaya-sarga, all serve the purpose of providing experience we can say the there is governance by design. All tattvas “serve” purusa.

Number 3 leads us to see the need for that for which the design functions. There must be that to which prakrti’s activity is directed, one who “experiences” or “enjoys” (bhoktr).

Purusa exists because there is the activity (pravrtti) for the purpose of the “realization of the distinct nature of consciousness (purusa)” which is termed kaivalyam. This may be seen as the activity all of us undertake to escape dissatisfaction (duhkha) and achieve “happiness.” This life of suffering or dissatisfaction, birth and death, is called samsara (lit. “wandering, going”) and all people wish to escape it. This activity (pravrtti) to realize kaivalyam cannot be caused by the prakrtic manifestations such as buddhi and the rest alone and must therefore be for the sake of some other than the three gunas and their products.

Karika 18 continues the discussion of the purusa. Purusas are said to be many. It offers three reasons for this view:

The diversity of birth and deaths;

Different activities, e.g., if one is engaged in virtue another person could be engaged in vice;

The differences in changes of gunas, e.g., one experiencing pleasure (sattva) while another experiences dissatisfaction (rajas) or yet another experiences delusion (tamas). Obviously, the plurality of purusas is established because of varying embodiments. Not being temporal or spatial, purusas do not bear relations without embodiment. Given that each embodiment is different, each purusa is isolated, ever alone. It is the realization and acceptance of this which leads to liberation.

Having established the plurality of purusas, Isvarakrsna now characterizes (S.K. 190 the purusa in its embodied condition as being:

A witness (saksi), in the sense the purusa is the “subject” of the prakrtic realm;

Distinct or isolated (kaivalyam) as the purusa is distinct from the three gunas and their products, i.e., the tattvas. Consciousness is other than the non-conscious;

Indifferent (madhyastham) like a “wandering holy man (parivrajaka) who is indifferent while the villagers cultivate their fields.”⁶⁴ The villagers are compared to the gunas, the sole agents of action;

a seer (drastr) because of his indifference;

inactive (akartr) in the midst of activity (gunas).⁶⁵

Buddhi and Purusa

A return to our discussion of Karika 20 is necessary. We referred to it in our discussion yet appear to be so because of their association (samyoga) with purusa. Reciprocally, the indifferent consciousness appears as an active agent because of the activities of the gunas. This association is compared in S.K. 21 to the association of a blind man (prakrti) and a lame man (purusa) who rides (samyoga) on his shoulders in order to get around. The purposes given for this association are for seeing the pradhana (the origin) and for the isolation of the purusa. Isvarakrsna adds that it is from this union or association (samyoga) that sargah or “emission” proceeds.

A brief glance back at the root of Indian literature is in order here. This Samkhyan view of emission had precedents as far back as the Rg Veda. In Rg Veda 10.90 the dismemberment of the purusa (man), the original sacrifice, is said to bring about the manifestation of the cosmos from his various parts. I cite one verse in particular which bears relation to our current theme of the relation of buddhi to purusa.

From him (purusa) viraj was born,
And from viraj came the purusa.
When he was born,
he ranged beyond the earth
Behind and before.⁶⁶

As Wendy Doniger points out in her notes on this Vedic hymn, viraj is the active female creative principle … later replaced by prakrti…”⁶⁷ The reciprocity at work here is that in order to “range beyond, behind and before the earth” purusa had to be carried, or more accurately, “embodied” by viraj. It is the work of prakrti to bring about the manifestations (sarga) for purusa to be borne in so the pradhana can be seen and kaivalyam can take place. As we have already noted, it is at the level of buddhi that purusa is “connected” to all that prakrti offers. This connection (samyoga) can be seen as both purusa’s “birth” and “ranging,” a lathe Rg Veda and the witnessing function of purusa in the Karikas.

Dating from as far back as the Rg Veda the experienced world was divided into three levels. Samkhya places its distinctive mark on this division by assigning a guna to each of the three realms. In the upper issue (urdhvam-sarga) there is an abundance of sattva, in the middle (madhya) an abundance of rajas, and in the root or lower (mula) an abundance of tamas. It is said that this is so from Brahma down to a clump of grass (S.K. 44).

Purusa, as consciousness (cetanah), receives or meets with (prapnoti) the dissatisfaction (duhkha) produced by old age and death in those three levels. Vacaspati says in his commentary on S.K. 55 that it is the fear of decay and death in all beings that is the cause of duhkha which is the fear itself. He continues adding that purusa means “one who lies in the subtle body (linga).”⁶⁸

It is said that the indifferent (madhyasthyam) purusa receives or meets with duhkha because of its being embodied by the linga. Please recall the linga comprises buddhi, ahamkara, manas, the ten capacities, and the five sensations or “subtle elements” (tanmatras).⁶⁹ In addition we must keep in mind that the linga is only the tattva structure and requires the bhavas are held to be that which organizes the activity of the linga as they are seen as causes giving rise to effects (nimitta-naimittika).⁷⁰ It is through the linga (samsara) occurs. This power (vibhuta) may be seen as the power of dispersal, as in Rg Veda 10.129.3, or the power that resulted from the sacrifice “in which everything was offered,” in Rg Veda 10.90.8.9. This power is the potency of the origin whose expressive urge is inherent in its association with purusa.

We have already seen that it is the buddhi which brings about all experience for the purusa as well as distinguishes (visinasti) the “subtle” difference between pradhana (origin) and consciousness. Gaudapada says that “subtle” means that the difference is not reachable by those who have not performed austerities (tapas). The subtlety here spoken of refers to the fact that in “seeing” the pradhana we are seeing the unmanifest wherein the gunas are not interacting. In this seeing one comes to know the subtle difference between purusa and pradhana.

A problem arises here with regard to the exact nature of the relationship between buddhi and purusa. Just how does buddhi provide the contents of experience for the purusa and how is it the purusa is said to “receive” or “meet with” (S.K. 55) the dissatisfaction that pervades the worlds of the three gunas? We must now recall purusa’s characteristics: its being a witness, isolated or distinct, indifferent, a seer, and inactive. Are not these characteristics contrary to purusa’s “receiving”? Would that not imply a change on the part of purusa? If purusa is isolated or distinct, how can buddhi provide experiential contents to a totally other? All the characteristics of purusa provided by Isvarakrsna seem to raise questions as to the possibility of a relationship in the first place. Let us explore this matter in some detail, with the aid of some of the Samkhyans.

In his commentary on S.K. 20, Gaudapada compares purusa to a man who is not a thief but who is identified as one because he has fallen into the company of thieves. Likewise, purusa is not an agent but has fallen into the company of agents, i.e., the three gunas. We obviously have a case of mistaken identity. But how is this mistake accounted for? Karika 57 states:

As the non-knowing milk functions
For the nourishment of the calf;
So the pradhana (source) functions
For the sake of the release of the purusa.

Guadapada takes this Karika to refer to the fact that things that are not conscious, such as milk which derives from grass and water, can functions for the sake of some end. It might appear that the non-conscious were conscious because of their acting toward some end. But how does purusa benefit from or “obtain” this activity? Karika 60 states that purusa does not act for any purpose. We can gather from this that purusa does not even act for itself. Karika 62 tells us that no one is bound, liberated or suffers samsara; only prakrti and her manifestations. Yet our experience, the fact that we experience dissatisfaction (duhkha), would tell us differently. It would seem that even though purusa was never really related to prakrti, Samkhyans and Yogis are called upon to answer the question of the “apparent” nature of the relationship.

In another text, the Yoga Sutra, Patanjali, using the Samkhya, is aware of this apparent bondage of the purusa and purusa’s apparent relationship to prakrti. I quote here Yoga Sutra (Y.S.) 1.3,4.

Then, the seer [purusa] abides in its own-form (sva-rupa).⁷¹
At other times it [the seer] takes the form of the modifications (vrtti).

Regarding Y.S. 1.3 Vayasa says that “then the power of consciousness (citi-sakti) is established in its own-form as in kaivala.” But, as if to caustion us about viewing the purusa exclusively from the prakrtic side or the side of bondage, he states, that when the mind (citti, internal organ) is in the emergent or manifest movement, the seer does not seem to be so established. In other word, we have a condition of samyoga. The seer’s own-form is concomitant with the buddhi’s ability to distinguish (visinasti) the subtle difference between the pradhana and the purusa and prakrti, seer and seen, by analogy. First he states that in the condition of emergence (vyuttana) of the citta (buddhi, ahamkara, manas) the purusa has modifications of the citta or mind. The key point here is the “not distinguished” (avisista). In that the citta-vritti-s or modifications of the mind are not seen as being different from the modifications of the purusa. Vyasa quotes Pancasikha who says, “There is only one appearance or vision (darsanam) and that is just knowledge (khyati).”⁷² In “normal” experiencing, the purusa is not distinguished from the contents of experience as the vrtti-s. One could say that the clarity of consciousness that resides at the heart of experience is concealed by attention to contents. Now Vayasa is in a position to provide the analogy. “The mind is like a magnet, by being seen it helps by merely being present [to purusa] and the purusa becomes the owner of property.”⁷³ The seer is provided with the contents of experience thereby generating experience.

It should be noted, as our commentators on the sutras find necessary, that these modifications are characterized by the activities of the three gunas. That is, the vrtti-s are characterized by pleasure (sukha), dissatisfaction (duhka) and delusion (moha) and can be peaceful (santa), violent (ghora), or dull mudha).⁷⁴

It is also important to note the Vyasa says that the cause of the purusa’s knowledge (bodha) of modifications of the mind is the beginningless connection (anadi-sambhanda). Obviously, a reference to the mind’s relation to consciousness. The association (samyoga) is said to be without beginning in the sense that we find ourselves to be always on this side of it We are always after the fact of the union of purusa and prakrti in the sense that they are eternal. As my life, each of our lives is concerned, we can never “get behind the beginning.” Our origin lies outside of time.

Vyasa says, “The purusa, the seer, experiences the buddhi. The seen is all the characteristics or marks (dharma) that ascend to the sattva of the buddhi.”⁷⁵ So for Vyasa the dharmas ascend to the illuminative aspect of buddhi to be presented to the seer. It is because of this presentation that buddhi is said to become the object (visaya) of experience (anubhava) even though the dharma, or that which is presented in the experience, are not different than the buddhi itself. The buddhi, once again as with citta above, is modified into the dharma or presentation and “seen” by the purusa, if the reader will recall, is indifferent. The kind of experience we normally use the word “seeing” to refer to, is indeed an active construal on the part of the internal organ (buddhi, ahamkara, manas). However, the seeing “done” by the purusa is in fact not a doing at all.⁷⁶ The recognition that at the heart of all presentations lies the clarity of pure consciousness is realization of our freedom.

We return now to our present difficulty. Vyasa says that the buddhi is, or provides the contents of experience. Purusa renders them conscious. How is this consciousness “transmitted” as it were? Does the buddhi become conscious in some sense? That would be a violation of some fundamental Samkhya tenets. Remember prakrti is non-conscious. We are in a position here to become acutely aware of one of the most difficult aspects of Samkhya doctrine, which by the way has never been “answered” to everyone’s satisfaction. Vacaspati Misra says that the buddhi becomes “of the nature of experience” (pratisamveditvam) because consciousness is reflected (chaya) or “colors” it. If, as was stated above, the buddhi becomes the object of experience by being modified into the dharmas, i.e., the object, is made possible by the presence of the reflection of consciousness.⁷⁷ So the buddhi is said to function like a mirror. However, as Vijnan Bhiksu has observed, this explanation is problematic, for if buddhi were to be at once the knower, as a result of the reflection or image of consciousness in it, and the known, because of the buddhi’s being modified into the dharma of the object, the budhhi would be both knower and known. Bhiksu sees this as the impossibility of being both the agent (kartr) of knowledge and the action (karma) wherein knowledge occurs. He states, “As there is a reflection or mirroring of the buddhi in consciousness so also… there is a reflection (pratibimba) of consciousness in buddhi…”⁷⁸ So Bhiksu says there is a twofold reflection required to account for experience in order to maintain puruas’s status as the agent (kartr) of knowledge or knower. He concludes this is necessary to avoid the problem inherent in the agent of knowledge and the act in oneself knowing itself directly.⁷⁹

For Vijnan Bhiksu, the atma is imposed (rudha) on the buddhi and the buddhi is modified (parinama) into the object and this dual “presence” is reflected back to the purusa/atma thereby giving rise to purusa’s experiencing of objects. This construal, he contends, avoids both the problem of the buddhi’s being both knower and known and the problem of the atma or purusa directly seeing itself because it sees its reflection in the buddhi. Of course, this raises the problem of the exact nature of the reflection “back” to the purusa.

Before we draw our own conclusions with regard to this problem a simplification by way of a summary of the main arguments and assertions is in order.

Isvarakrsna says that because the association (samyoga) of purusa and prakrti the non-conscious appears as if conscious and the indifferent (udasinah) purusa appears as if active because of the acts of the three gunas. From this samyoga manifestation emerges.

Patanjali has a number of sutras devoted to describing this association. He states that when the modifications of the mind (citta-vrtti-s) are restricted (nirodha) the seer (purusa) is established in its own form. At other times it takes the form of the modifications () is established in its own form. At other times it takes the form of the modifications (Y.S. 1.3, 4). Ignorance (avidya) is perceiving the non-eternal as the eternal, the impure as pure dissatisfaction as satisfaction, and non-self as self (atman), another clear reference to a confusion of purusa/atman and prakrti (three gunas) (Y.S. 2.5). As a result of this confusion of the power to see (buddhi) and the seer (purusa) the sense of I-am-ness (asmita) arises and consciousness is concealed (Y.S. 26). The cause of dissatisfaction is the previously mentioned association (Y.S. 2.17). The seer, which only sees, although pure, looks upon that which is presented in the mind (Y.S. 2.20). The association is the cause of the perception of the identity (svarupa) of the owner (purusa) and the owned (mind) (Y.S. 2.23). The cause of this association is ignorance. When once escaped, the distinction (kaivalyam) of seer and seen is realized (Y.S. 2.25). The means of escape is steady or unwavering discriminative knowledge (viveka-khyatir aviplavaI) which is the act of distinguishing the sattva guna and the purusa (Y.S. 2.26). This escape is also seen as an equality of purity between the sattva guna (as the purified buddhi) and the purusa (Y.S. 3.55). Consciousness does not join with anything but perceives or experiences (samvedanam) its own buddhi and enters into a “relation” with the form of it (Y.S. 4.22). (Recall that the buddhi is modified into the dharma of the object of experience.) The modifications of the mind (citta-vritti-s) are always known by their master due to the changelessness of the purusa (Y.S. 4.18). All object can be known because the mind is “colored” or affected (uparaktam) by the seer and the seen (Y.S. 4.23).

These quotations from Isavarkrsna and the Yoga Sutras present the main assertions concerning the relation of purusa and prakrti or consciousness and the modifiable source. More could be added, however, these should suffice to summarize the Yoga-Samkhya positions. The commentaries we have employed are responding to these major points. We must now examine the arguments, but from a few somewhat unorthodox approaches.

First, what prompts the debate? Obviously when we have pure consciousness on one side and prakrti, or what has been variously translated as “nature,” “materiality,” or even “matter” on the other, we are pressed into defining their relation. But are they two sides? Just as one can distinguish form and color but can never separate them, so too we can distinguish purusa and prakrti, but never separate them. For example, if we look at the matter from the point of view of experience, the goal of Yoga and Samkhya is to distinguish consciousness from prakrti thereby discovering the isolated or distinct nature of purusa. That does not mean that we consider them as two separate entities and thus are logically compelled to elucidate their relationship to one another as two separate entities. It may be helpful, in terms of one’s own liberation to examine (tattva-abhyasa) the role of purusa as being distinct from the three gunas of prakrti but that is quite different than having to account, logically, for a relationship between two separate entities. Purusa is not an entity that has relationships. Consciousness is consciousness. It is non-relational. To examine experience is not necessarily to leap into an abstraction or analysis of the experience. The meditative or liberative examination of experience is just that, examination, i.e., “to inspect closely.” It is only when we leap from examination to theorization that we reify both prakrti and purusa and we feel compelled to relate them in theory. Examination and theorization are two different operations. Theorization demands abstraction and reification. Examination or meditation (tattva-abhyasa, i.e., the practice of the tattvas) requires a stilling of theorization (see Y.S. 1.2). It is comparable, in some respects, to theorizing about the ontology of number counting. To deploy number in counting is like practice; one examines the tattvas in their respective operations, “doing them” as it were. To ask about the being of numer is a different focus; to ask about the relation of purusa and prakrti as entities is a call to adhere to the demands of a logic of relations.

Second, we again ask, “what prompts the debate”? In the first instance we noted that the movement from practice to theory, from examination to reification, allowed for or even impelled the move to consider the logical relationship between consciousness and prakrti. Another impetus that may have prompted the debates was biographical. The “philosophers” who engaged in the various debates did so, obviously, at a time and place wherein debate was a scholastic requirement. If you were assertive and convincing in the presentation of your philosophical position, which often took the form of debates with other positions, converts and patronage could be your rewards. Each of the philosophical systems could be seen to rest on certain tacit assumptions; all are approximations or “likely stories.”⁸⁰ Each position would interpret the others from a vantage point with a vested interest. Even within on “school” self-interpretation was often problematic, as we have had occasion to witness. Philosophy is always sone by someone at some time, in some place. We must always consider the biographical as an integral component of the why, what, and how of philosophy.

The practice of Samkhya or Yoga was not the subject of debate. Once again, it was the abstractions that were derived from the practices that became the subject of theorization. It is no doubt true that the contents of each of the “schools” guided the practice. What to examine and how were of course linguistically formulated. The actual experience of life perspective engendered by each of the legitimate schools of liberation was however not linguistic. A case in point is the Vedantic vs. the Samkhya viewpoint concerning the so called dualism of Samkhya. While the Samkhyans hold that the ultimate reality of like is dual, i.e., purusa and prakrti, the Advaita Vedantins hold that it is one, i.e., brahman. However, Vedantins see brahman as having two apects, nirguna-brahman (Brahman without gunas) and saguna-brahman (brahman with gunas). The Samkhyan experience would not be described as “separation” of purusa from prakrti but a distinction between the two. The Vedantins would hold to a similar distinction known by different language. Certainly the Vedantic view changed the nature of the debate over the relation of consciousness to the movement of manifestation from and to the source. The rigid distinction made by Samkhya between consciousness and the modifiable source prompted, on the part of the theoreticians, the move to relate them logically. If the relation did not meet the demands of logic, given the characteristics provided purusa and prakrti, another explanation had to be sought which would conform. The Vedantists on the other hand had to relate brahman to itself, an apparently simpler task. The point that needs to be emphasized however, is the experiential similarity or perhaps even “identity” (at the risk of fostering another debate) of ultimate reality. As is always the case, the biographical aspects of this debate need be kept in mind.

Lastly, we appeal to the Vedic verse that the One was pronounced to be many be the sages.⁸¹ That experience of the One which gives rise to a life of awakened living fostered many construal, many interpretations which, once concretized, became “schools.” Often the interpretive nature of a school would be forgotten and debate ensued about the “real” nature of things. For someone to be “right,” someone had to be “wrong.” Once the experiential and fundamental groundless ground is forgotten, dogma rears its ugly head. Fortunately, Indian culture and history always had its sages and Yogis who maintained contact with “the ground,” providing ever new and fresh perspectives which enriched and enlivened the culture. An adept could say nothing “systematic” and attempt to avoid the pitfalls of a school or could begin a new school or enliven an existing school with the originality of the Vision. In addition one might regard debate itself as practice. If one could come to clarity on the tenets of a school, one’s practice might be enhanced by such clarity. There were any number of possible alternatives.

The point of this rather lengthy discussion on sectarian dispute goes beyond the confines of our examination of buddhi. It could provide the basis for tolerance and understanding of other liberative perspectives that have been or will come to be. However, we must keep in mind that the only authentic understanding which allows us to avoid misconstruing this as some form of relativism lies in accepting that the fundamental reality is also a Vision. It is not enough to simply assert the truth of all liberative schools. How would one authenticate their validity? The basis for their truth or authenticity is the Vision which is fundamental reality itself. Both absolutism and relativism find no place in such a scheme. It is only by way of the highest Vision itself, and it subsequent integration into one’s incarnate living that the authority of the Vision fends off relativism and the tendency to scholasticism to lead to absolutism.

Buddhi and Prakrti

We have already discussed the association (samuoga) of buddhi and purusa. However, it remains to be seen how buddhi acts as a modification of prakrti (pradhana, mula-prakrti, alinga, avyakta).

Isvarakrsna informs us that the whole (krtsnam) of experience is presented to the buddhi for the sake of purusa (S.K. 35) We discussed above the bhavas and the role they play in the act which is buddhi, i.e., adhyavasaya (determination). All experience is fed to the buddhi and at the same time determined by the buddhi to be “what” it is. That is to say, experience is structured or construed through the act which is understanding. The bhavas and the linga work together to provide us “the movement of experience” (pratyaya-sarga). Of course, given the action of the bhavas in this movement we could add the the bhavas and the linga provide the “meaningful” movement of experience However, because all experience other than the highest Vision, can e said to be meaningful, the addition of “meaningful” to “the movement of experience” is redundant.

As we saw, the bhavas are in the act of understanding termed adhyavasaya” or “determination.” Given that the linga (i.e. buddhi, ahamkara, manas, 10 capacities, 5 tanmatras) is generated and acts for the sake of the purusa because of its connection (prasangena) with causes and effects, and these are the structure of the buddhi (or act of determination), we are lead to investigate the role of prakrti that moves the linga and hence the acts of construal. Prakrti is the origin or source of all manifestation (vyakta). Its undifferentiated plentitude is raw power (sakti) itself. It is the beginning and end of each moment of the movement of the pratyay-sarga. Yet, sheer power alone will not suffice for experience to be possible. Structure as both linga and bhava is necessary. The power of prakrti is modified into the structure of experience through the functioning of the bhava/linga structure, which as we noted above, remains stable (niyatam), allowing for the seeming continuity of exprience.⁸² So praktri, as undifferentiated power (alinga), requires that it modify itself into a structural regularity in order for experience to occur for the sake of consciousness.

It should be noted though, that the structural regulation of “power” it itself human experience. As such it is subject to continual modification through the ascendancy and descendancy of the bhavas in one’s life. The linga itself, as the functioning of the “hardware” is stable but the bhavas are in continual transformation, ordering and reordering experience.

Buddhi and Samskara

Derived from the verbal root kr meaning “to make, to do,” plus the prefix sam meaning “together,” samskara is variously translated as “putting together, forming well, forming the mind, a sacred or sanctifying ceremony, the faculty of memory, impression on the mind of acts done in a former state of existene,” etc. Isvarakrsna states that once the seven bhavas have arrived at causlessness (akarana-praptau) because of the attainment of correct knowledge (jnana) the sarira (buddhi, ahamkara, manas, 10 indriyas) is continued or supported (dhrta) because of the desire (vasa) of samskaras (S.K. 67). It is because past actions (karma) leave impressions (samskara) that experience continues even after the attainment of the liberating bhava of knowledge. In the prior karika Isvarakrsna says that even though liberation has taken place, purusa and prakrti are still associated (samyoga) and no sarga (manifestation of tattva and bhavas) unfolds. He then immediately adds the notion of samskara in order to counter any notion that upon the attainment of knowledge experience ceases.

Samskaras are not simply the residua of past acts but the impulse to repeat them, hence Isvarakrsna’s use of the word vasa meaning “will, wish, desire,” It is these samskaras, which every act from construal to ”physical” movement leaves, that determine present and future experience to be what it is or will be. Acts lead one closer or nearer in the movement towardkaivalyam and hence determine the ascendancy or descendancy or the bhavas. Even though knowledge be attained, samskaras as “impluse” will generate the continued experience of the sarira for the purusa.⁸³

“Upon the attainment of distinction or difference (bheda) from the sarira, and the cessation of the origin (pradhana) comes the obtainment of kaivalyam which is complete and final” (S.K. 68). The karika recalls S.K. 1 which states the reasons for Samkhya practice, i.e.certain liberation and the knowledge of the removal of the threefold dissatifaction (dhuka). Most translators/interpreters have taken the word bheda to read “separation.”⁸⁴ Isvarakrsna himself states that even after the attainment of knowledge samyoga is still the case. I think the difficulty here lies in the fact that translators often use “proximity,” a spatial disignation to translate samyoga. This, it would seem, prompts the usage of “separation” for bheda. I have given stress to these few points of translation/interpretation because there has been undue emphasis on prakrti’s cessation, and therefore on the cessation of experience, at the expense of discussion of the “living liberated” in Samkhya commentaries, both classical and contemporary.

Manifest, Unmanifest and Knower

Buddhi, as we have repeatedly observed, is both the determining function and the receptalbe of the products of the ahamkara, manas, and 10 indriyas. Determining and receivingare two sides of the same coin, experience. The functions of the presenting tattvas and the determining (adhyavasaya) of the buddhi occur at once. Experience is then, to borrow from Jose Ortega y Gasset once again, structure. Ortega says, “Structure equals elements plus order.”⁸⁵ The diverse elements, tattvas, are ordered (bhava and samskara) to provide experience and liberation for each purusa. Although alternate renderings or refinements are possible, I offer this only to make an important point. Often Samkhya and Yoga have been viewed as soe form of realism This is simply not the case. Nor are these “schools” idealistic. The following discussion should make this clear.

The Samkhyan is told at the outset (S.K. 2) that he or she must come to a knowledge (vijnana) of manifest (vyakta), unmanifest (avyakta), and knower (jna) in order to remove the threefold suffering. Human life is all three of these. We are, each of us, purusa, prakrti, and prakrti’s manifestations. As such we are consciousness, and the other 24 tattvas. Let us consider the incarnational implication of this.

Consciousness is just that, consciousness It does not act but merely witnesses. Prakrti is the source of all manifestation. It is the disequilibrium of her three gunas, sattva, rajasand tamas, that sets in motion the movement of experience (pratyaya-sarga). In this movement of the manifest order, the non-conscious is taken to be conscious, i.e., the functioning of the internal organ (buddhi, ahamkara, manas) is taken to be consciousness itself, and consciousness is taken to be active, i.e., a doer, because of the movements of the three gunas. This is samyoga, or to be more specific avidya.⁸⁶ What must be borne in mind at this point is that we are the unmanifest as well as the manifest. The manifest is a modification of our own life. To add a felt dimension to this we might say that our “body” or fundamentally felt reality is the unmanifest. As such, all becoming is an embodied becoming. This is made conscious by consciousness. The Samkhyan must come to “know” the unmanifest not as an objectively existing thing, a disembodied knoweldge, but as his or her own life. In this kind of knowing, statements derived from the Rg Veda, Upanisads, Gita and other sources ring true in a Samkhya context.⁸⁷

It is in this light that consciousness may be said to be all-pervasive (S.K. 10). If my “body” is the unmanifest which is all-pervasive and purusa is all becoming. The marriage or samyogaof purusa and prakrti is my felt (conscious) condition or fundamental reality which manifests and absorbs all becoming. “I” am this threefold play of tattvas, i.e., manifest, unmanifect and knower.

This description is realized in one way as Yogic samadhi. Yoga Sutra 3.3 states that when meditation (dhyana) appears as the object (of meditation) exclusively, and is as if empty of its own-form, that is termed samadhi. In other words, when the only focus or content of the meditation is its object (artha) as it is, in and as the mind (citta), that is called samadhi.⁸⁸ When the object of meditation and the meditation become one, the part is the whole, and the whole is the part. In this sense it may be saind that the unmanifest is the manifest and the manifest is the unmanifest. The objest becomes the totality. The totality is the object. It must be kept in mind however, that Patanjali says, “artha-matra,” i.e. the object alone. There is no sense of meditator or meditation. There is just that, as if the meditation is empty of itself.

I cite this type of samadhi or unitive attention” only to illustrate one way of the buddhi’s interaction with both the manifest (vaykta) and the unmanifest (avyakta). It is at the level of buddhi that the manifest is seen to be a modification (vrtti) of the unmanifest. There really is no difference between these two. In Yogic experiential fact, prakrti becomes all but never loses her true identity as prakrti. In mythological terms, the divine mother or sakti manifests herself and withdraws herself as herself only. Each manifestation is a manifestation of her, in total. She is, in Yogic fact, undivided yet appears to be so. This leads Isvarakrsna to declare:

It is my thought that there is nothing more delicate than prakrti, who [says] ‘I have been seen’ and never again comes into the vision of purusa (S.K. 61).

The delicacy he speaks of can be equated with prakrti’s ability to conceal herself through her manifestations. However, once her manifestation have been “seen” to be her by acts of intelligence (buddhi) she withdraws herself and one understands one’s life as the source. The well known wave/ocean analogy works here; the wave is the manifest, the ocean is the unmanifest. The wave is the entire ocean’s wave; it is the ocean itself. It is buddhi which, in presetting the whole of experience to purusa, is the wave and the ocean simultaneously. The act that is buddhi is an act of prakrti as the unmanifest, determining herself. The determination and the buddhi, please recall, are one and the same. Also the tattva structure, the bhavas, and samskaras are not functioning sequentially but simultaneously. Therefore, the acts of buddhi are cotemporaneous with the acts that are all the other structural regularities of prakrti as she becomes, moment to moment.⁸⁹ Even sequential preception, as is the case when attempting to determine “what something is,” the tattvas, bhavas, and variouse samskaras are functioning simultaneously.

If the Yogi or Samkhyan realizes his or her “bodily” identity to be prakrti then all of her manifestation are manifestations of one’s own life. We are, each of us, the origin of all manifestation. It is in and as our sacred interior, wherein purusa and prakrti are joined, that the living and dynamic source of creation generously and endlessly issues forth living worlds. The awareness at the heart of this movement is carried forth into the entirety by prakrti’s becoming. It is because we are prakrti that consciousness pervades the whole.⁹⁰

The buddhi in its bhava of knowledge detects the subtle difference between the purusa and the origin. It is the buddhi which also “knows,” in the most subtle “incarnational” sense, manifestation to be prakrti’s own becoming. Buddhi is the nexus between the unmanifest, manifest and purusa. Yoga takes place in the buddhi. It is buddhi that unites all three in human experience and yet distinguishes all three in knowledge (jnana).

The repeated stress laid on budhi-yukta of a “yoked intellect” in the Bhagavad Gita is not without significance. No less than eight explicit references to it appear there.⁹¹ A buddhi that is yoked or “joined” is a knowledge that is synomymous with the threefold movement of life, the sacred commerce of the manifest, unmanifest and knower, and a knowledge that transcends the threefold dissatisfaction (duhka-traya).

Appendix I

The bhavas are held by Guadapada to be of three kinds:

samsiddhika (innate, native). These are dharma (virture), jnana (knowledge), vairagyam (dispassion), and aisvaryam (power). Gaudapada says that these are native or innate because they were “born” with Kapila at the original emanation (adi-sarga).

Prakrtika, (from prakrti) and translated as “original, ordinary, usual.” Gaudapada provides a mythological interpretation of these stating that these four bhavas (i.e., dharma, jnana, vairgyam, aisvaryam) were produced with the four sons of Brahman. In effect, these four are held to be manifestations of the fundamental reality (i.e., Brahman).

Vaikrtika (modified, derivative, subject change). Generally translated as “acquired” these four are held to be found in humans. They are considered acquired because they come from the “embodiment” of a teacher (acarya-murti).

It would seem that we are endowed with native dispositions (bhavas) which can grant us access to their source (Brahman) when we have received the sacred teachings from their embodiment in the form of a teacher.

Appendix II

Karika 46

1. Subjective evolution (pratyayasargah) distinguished by:
2. Error – viparyaya
3. Incapacity – asakti
4. Contentment – tusti
5. Success – siddhi
6. These become fifty via ­gunaparinama (transformations of the gunas):

The Fifty Divisions

Karika 47

1. Five varieties of error
2. Ignorance, darkness or obscurity (avidya, tamas)
3. Egoism, delusion (advidya, moha)
4. Desire, extreme delusion (rage, mahomoha)
5. Aversion, thick darkness (dvesa, tamisra)
6. Clinging, total darkness (abhinivesa, andhatamisra)*
7. Twenty-eight varieties of incapacity (i.e. defects in faculties)
8. Nine varieties of contentment (tusti)
9. Eight varieties of success (siddhi)

* The five types of error constitute the five klesas or afflictions of the Yoga Philosophy of Pantanjali, i.e., avidya (ignorance), asmita (I-am-ness), raga (dwelling on pleasure), dvesa (dwelling on dissatisfaction), and abhinivesa (clinging to life as a self).

Karika 48

1. Eight varieties of obscurity or darkness (tamas) and delusions (moha)
2. A man merging into the eight evolvents (prakrti, buddhi, ahamkara and the five tanmatras) is darkness (tamas).
3. Those deities, having attained the eight powers, take themselves to be immortal and their powers to be everlasting. This is egoism and delusion (moha).
4. Ten varieties of extreme delusion (mahamoha): Attachment to the objects of sense which are tenfold. Both divine and human attachment make for the tenfold division. This is mahamoha.
5. Thick darkness tamisra) and total darkness (adnhatamisra) are both eighteen-fold. The cultivation of the eight powers for the purpose of enjoying the tenfold objects of sense. This is the eighteen-fold tamisra (thick darkness).
6. The dread of losing the eighteen-fold powers and objects or the darkness that results from losing them. This is total darkness (andhatamisra) and clinging (abhinivesa).

Karika 49 Twenty Eight Varieties of asakti (incapacity).

1. Injuries to the eleven organs together with injuries to the buddhi. This denotes incapacity. Injuries to the eleven organs are:
2. Deafness
3. Blindness
4. Paralysis
5. Loss of taste
6. Loss of smell
7. Dumbness
8. Mutilation
9. Lameness
10. Constipation
11. Impotence
12. Madness
13. The injuries to the buddhi are seventeen-fold due to the frustration of contentment and success. The inversion of the nine-fold contentment and the eightfold success are the seventeen varieties of incapacity of the buddhi.

Karika 50: Contentment is ninefold:

1. Internal – four varieties:
2. Those who remain content with their vision of prakrti.
3. The contentment that arises from the security of a means or method (upadana).
4. The contentment that arises when a man says “I shall get liberation in time (kala), why practice.”
5. Luck (bahya) – “I’ll get liberation by sheer luck.”
6. External Contentment (bahya) is fivefold:
7. Contentment derived from the five objects of sense being renounced.

The inversion of these nine kinds of contentment constitutes the varieties of incapacity in the buddhi.

Karika 51: The eight perfections (siddhi) are:

1. Primary (mukhya) – the removal of the duhkhatraya (the threefold dissatisfaction).
2. Secondary – (gaunya):
3. Study or reasoning (adhyayanam) – text work and proper reasoning.
4. Oral instruction (sabda) – hearing the teachings and comprehending the meaning of the texts.
5. Reasoning (uha) based on texts.
6. Acquisition of friends (suhrtprapti) – acquiring friends and teacher who are spiritual.
7. Generosity (danam).^*

^{* The foregoing analysis is taken, with minor changes, from Ganganath Jha, trans., The Tattva Kaumudi: Vacaspati Misra’s Commentary on the Samkhya-Karika (Poon, India: Oriental Book Agency, ?).↩}

Endnotes

<sup>1. The term buddha is referred to as a proper name in at least two instances as the father of Pururavas (perhaps a precursor of the Samkhyan purusa) and the son of Soma.↩
2. For the Sanskrit text of the Upanisads, I have used S. Radhakrishnan, The Principal Upanisads, 3rd ed. (New Jersey: Humanities Press International, 1992). Atmanam rathinam viddhi sariram ratham eva tu buddhim tu saradhim viddhi manah pragraham eve ca.↩
3. Indriyebhyah para hy artha arthebhyas ca param manah manasas ca para budhir buddher atma mahan parah
Mahatah param avyaktam avyaktat purusah parah pursusan no param kincit sa kastha sa para gatih↩
4. Yado pancavatisthante jnanani manasa saha buddhis ca no vicestati tam ahuh paramam gatim↩
5. Robert Ernest Hume, The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, 2nd ed. (London: Oxford University Press 1931).↩
6. Radhakrishnan, The Principal Upanishads. 819.↩
7. Bhagavad Gita (hereafter cited as (B.G.) 2.39, 41, 44, 49, 51; 5.28; 6.25; 8.7; 10.10; 12.8, 14; 18.37, 51 Also in chapter 13 the tattvas are given along with additional members of the “field.”↩
8. B.G. 2.3,65,66; 3.2,40,42; 5.11,20,222,28; 6.25; 8.7; 12.14; 18.49.↩
9. Ibid. Chapter 14. Also see Yogi Ananda Viraj, “Affliction and the Structure of Experience,” Moksha Journal 6.1 for a detailed examination of the functioning of the gunas.↩
10. B.G. 2.52; 3.2; 10.4; 18.16,29, 30-32,37-39.↩
11. Ibid 18.20, 21.↩
12. For the references to buddhi in pre-karika Samkhya, we are indebted to Gerald James Larson and Ram Shankar Bhattacharya, Samkhya: A Dualist Tradition in Indian Philosophy, Vol. 4 of Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).↩13. Ibid. p 118-19, a quote by V.M. Bedekar summarizing Moksadharma of Vyasa (Y.S.B.) 1.4, “ekameva darsanam, khyatireva darsanam iti.” For the Sanskirt text I have used Patanjala-Yogadarsanam, ed. Ram Shankar Bhattacharya (Varanasi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakasans, 1963).↩
14. Yogasutrabhasya of Vayasa (Y.S.B.), 1.4, “ekameva darsanam, khyatireva darsanam iti.” For the Sanskrit text I have used Patanjala-Yogadarsanam, ed. Ram Shankar Bhattacharya (Varanasi:Bharatiya Vidya Prakasans, 1963).↩
15. Y.S.B. 2.15. There is some debate regarding this and other quotations attributed to Pancasikha by Vacaspati. Some say they belong to Varsaganya.↩
16. Viraj, “Affliction,” 8.↩
17. Y.S.B. 2.17.↩
18. Ibid. 2.20 and again at 4.22.↩
19. For a discussion of this text see Larson and Bhattacharya, Encyclopedia, 125-128.↩
20. Ibid. p. 127.↩
21. Pulinbihari Chakravarti, Origin and Development of the Samkhya System of Thought, 2nd ed. (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharial, 1975), 179.↩
22. Larson and Bhattacharya, Encyclopedia, 137.↩
23. Ibid. 144, and Chakravarti, Origin, 181.↩
24. Chakravarti, Origin, 141.↩
25. Ibid. 138-141.↩
26. This view is put forth by Chakravarti, ibid, 141. See Y.S.B. 2.19.↩
27. Larson and Bhattacharya, Encyclopedia, 146.↩
28. Ibid, 149.↩
29. Ibid.↩
30. Ibid.↩
31. From our cultural perspective, this analysis of suffering may seem a bit odd. However, if one keeps in mind the presuppositions of Indian culture at this time, this version of the causes of suffering, especially the celestial, seems quite in keeping with their cosmology. Even cosmological events take place within my life, i.e., within the tattvas and therefore our manner of experiencing them is either binding or liberating.↩
32. See Samkhya-Karika 46.↩
33. For a more detailed discussion of the tattvas see Yogi Ananda Viraj, “An Outline of Samkhya-Yoga Philosophy,” Moksha Journal (1991), 5.2:10.↩
34. Antonio de Nicolas, trans., The Bhagavad Gita (York Beach, Maine: Nicolas Hayes, Inc., 1990), 33.↩
35. S.K. 23.↩
36. All five bhutas are a movement and should not be conceived of as “placed” before us once and for all. They are in a continual ebb and flow and are quite alive or dynamic as aspects of our embodied life.↩
37. See S.K. 43-52.↩
38. As to the actual composition of the linga as opposed to the subtle body (suksma-sarira) there is some debate amongst the Samkyhans.↩
39. S.K. 35, santahkarana buddhih sarvam visayam avagahate yasmat tasmat trividham karanam dvari dvarani sesani. For the Sanskrit test of the Samkhya Karikas I have used M. Ganganath Jha, trans., The Tattva-Kaumudi: Vacaspati Misra’s Commentary on the Samkhya-Karika (Poona: Oriental Book Agency).↩
40. See Jose Ortega y Gasset, Some Lessons in Metaphysics, trans. Mildred Adams (New York: Norton 1969).↩
41. This is the view of Gaudapada in his Bhasya on S.K.32.↩
42. Gaudapada-Bhasya (G.B.) on S.K. 32. This text was composed roughly at the same time as Vyasa’s Samkhyapravacana-bhasya, ca. 500-600 C.E.↩
43. Tattva-Kaumudi (T.K.) of Vacaspati Misra (ca. 850 or 975 C.E.) on S.K. 32.↩
44. T.K. on S.K. 37.↩
45. See B.G. 11, 19-30.↩
46. See Larson and Bhattacharya, Encyclopedia, 144 and 260.↩
47. Vindhyavasin’s doctrine of the all-pervasiveness of the buddhi-indriyas is somewhat tangential to our study specifically of buddhi. We merely will be mentioning the doctrine of the linga or sarira, i.e., the “subtle body.”↩
48. It should be noted here that the manner in which the emergence of the five elements (bhutas) occurs differs for different Samkhyans, e.g., Varsaganya, it is said in the Yuktidipika, holds the accumulation theory regarding the production of the elements. Each subsequent tanmatra is a combination of itself plus its predecessor(s). See Larson and Bhattacharya, Encyclopedia, 137-8.↩
49. See Viraj, “Affliction,” for a more detailed discussion of the gunas and their operation.↩
50. T.G. Mainkar, trans, The Samkhyakarika of Isvarakrsna with the Commentary of Gaudapada, Second ed. (Poona: Oriental Book Agency, 1972, 7. This is the bhasya on S.K. 12.↩
51. Ibid. 71.↩
52. See B.G. 3.28.↩
53. See B.G. 2.62, 63.↩
54. M Ganganath Jha, trans. The Tattva-Kaumudi: Vacaspati Misra’s Commentary on the Samkhya-Karika (Poona: Oriental Book Agency), 48.↩
55. Y.S. 2.6, Christopher Chapple and Yogi Ananda Viraj, trans. The Yoga Sutra of Patanjali: An Analysis of the Sanskrit with Accompanying English Translation (Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1990), 59.↩
56. See for example, Yogi Ananda Viraj, “Isvara in the Yoga Sutras: Practice and Perspective,” Moksha Journal 7.1.↩
57. See Y.S.B. 2.6.↩
58. See S.K. 23 and Y.S. 1.4.↩
59. See S.K. 23-25, 40, 44 45.↩
60. B.G. 6.8; also see Y.S. 1.16 (Emphasis added).↩
61. Although most of the Bhagavad Gita is concerned with the enactment of this vision, one may refer to the following passages for quick reference, 13.26-28.↩
62. tad eva artha-matra-nirbasam svarupa-sunyam iva Samadhi. This same [mediation] appearing as the object alone and , as it were, empty of itself, is Samadhi. Y.S. 3.3. This description of Samadhi is where the mind (citta) becomes so focused upon the object (artha) of concentration (dharana) and meditation (dhyana) that it becomes empty of all else but the focus on the object, i.e., becomes empty of all else but the focus on the object, i.e., becomes empty of everything but the object.↩
63. In Yoga the term pratiprasava, also from the root su, plus prati “back” is used as the retrieval or reduction of the tattvas back into their origin (pradhana) and the reduction of the gunas “whose natures are causes and effects” (karya-karana-atmakanam), into the condition of equilibrium or lack of interaction, i.e., into their origin (pradhana). In the first instance this is accomplished to escape the subtle effects of the five afflictions. In the second, a purusa is released and distinguished, i.e. realized as being distinct from the sattva of the buddhi.↩
64. Gaudapada Bhasya on S.K. 19.↩
65. Ibid.↩
66. Wendy Doniger, trans., The Rig Veda: An Anthology (England: Penguin Books, 1981) 30.↩
67. Ibid 31.↩
68. Jha, The Tattva-Kaumudi, 152.↩
69. See note 37.↩
70. Bhavas as causes (nimitta) and their effects (naimittikas):
from dharma (virtue) there results movements upwards;
from adharma (vice) there results movement downwards;
from jnana (knowledge) there results apavarga (completion, release);
from vairagya (detachment) there results dissolution into prakrti;
from rajas-raga (passionate attachment) there results wandering (samsara);
from aisvarya (Lordliness, supremacy) there results non-obstruction;
from the opposite (viparyaya) of supremacy there results obstruction.
Please see appendices I and II.                             S.K. 54, 55.↩
71. At this point in our discussion it will be helpful if we make some appeal to Yoga “philosophy.” Utilizing Samkhyan language as it does and drawing commentaries from Samkhyans for its elucidation. Yoga is, in the main, Samkhya. We will be employing four Yoga sources in our discussions of this aspect of buddhi: Patanjalis’s Yoga Sutra (Y.S.) (ca. 300), Vyasa’s Samkhyapravacana-bhasya (V.B.) (ca. 850 or 975 C.E.), and Vijnana Bhiksu’s Yogavarttika (Y.V.) (ca. 1550-1600).↩
72. This quotation from V.B. 1.4 is attributed to Pancasikha by Vacaspati Misra in T.V. 1.4.↩
73. V.B. 1.4 and 2.17.↩
74. T.V. and Y.V. 1.4.↩
75. V.B.2.17. drast buddheh pratisamvedi purusah drsya buddhi-sattvas uparudhah sarve dharmah.↩
76. I am reminded here of the beautiful description given the concept of mind in the Tibetan Buddhism by the Dalai Lama in “A Buddhist Concept of Mind” in Daniel Goleman and Robert A.F. Thurman, eds., Mind Science: An East-West Dialogue, (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1991). It seems to me that the Dalai Lama’s description of the “clear light mind” has many affinities with the buddhi that has been purified and yields itself to the clarity of purusa.↩
77. T.V. 2.17.↩
78. Y.V. 1.4. “…citi buddheh pratibimbaevam buddhavapi cit-pratibimbam …”↩
79. Y.V. 1.4. svayam saksat-sva-darsane karma-kartr virodhena↩
80. In Plato’s Timaeus, Socrates is told by Timaeus that when speaking of the gods and the generation of the universe, we must settle for the “likely” tale, for we are only mortals.↩
81. Rg Veda 10.114.5, 1.164.46.↩
82. S.K. 40. Actually, the linga not bhava is declared to be stable because bhavas rise and fall (S.K. 44, 45).
83. In other “schools” of Indian philosophy the liberated ones are termed jivan-mukti, “liberated yet embodied,” precisely because samskaras generate continued experience. It is said of the liberated that once their samskaras are worn or burned out they cease to be reborn.↩
84. See for example T.G. Mainkar, The Samkhya Karika, 204 and Gerald James Larson, Classical Samkhya 2nd ed. (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1979), 275. It should be noted, however, that Larson, who is probably the foremost Western authority on the Samkhya tradition, in his and Karl Potter’s summary on the Samkhya Karikas in Larson and Battacharya, Encyclopedia, 163, uses “distinction” but seems to see this distinction as occurring solely because of the cessation of prakrti (“materiality” in their translation). We must not ignore the fact that the sarira continues (dhrta-sarirah) because of samskara and therefore the pradhana is not necessarily in cessation while distinction is realized.↩
85. Almost all of Ortega’s works deal, more or less, with this theme. However, for a foundational discussion see Jose Ortega y Gasset, Meditations on Quixote, trans. Evelyn Rugg and Diego Marin (New York: W.W. Norton, 1963).↩
86. Avidya or ignorance is defined in the Yoga Sutras as: anitya-asuci-dukha-anatmasu nitya-suci-sukha-atma-khatir (Y.S. 2.5) Ignorance is knowing the non-eternal as the eternal, the impure as the pure, dissatisfaction as satisfaction and the non-self as the self.↩
87. See for example, Rg Veda 1090. Brihadaranyaka Upanisad 1.1.1-7, 1.4.1-17, 2.3.1, 3.7.1-23. This list could be interminable. I refer the reader lastly to Chapter 15 of the B.G.↩
88. In Yoga there are many forms and levels of samadhi, all culminating in the samadhi without object or “seedless” samadhi.↩
89. The Yogic vision of time distinguished between karma (sequence), which is considered a “fabrication of the buddhi” (buddhi-nirmana) and ksana (moment), which is instantaneous and considered to be time itself. The exact measurements of a ksana have been carried out, naturally with differing interpretations, by Hindus, Buddhists, and Jains alike.↩
90. See B.G. 15.12,16,17,18.↩
91. See e.g., B.G. 2.39,49,50,51,66; 18.51.↩</sup>